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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Deputy for National Intelligence

45 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the SCC Sub-Committee on CTB
Negotiations

FROM : Robert R. Bowie
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
SUBJECT : Chinese Response to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Attached please find a memo on the Chinese response to a comprehensive test ban treaty which was requested at one of our recent meetings. It was drafted by the East Asia/Pacific Division of CIA's Office of Regional and Political Analysis.



Robert R. Bowie

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Members:

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Les Gelb, State
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cc: Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, NSC
Mr. John Marcum, NSC

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15 July 1977

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Chinese Response to Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

1. Since its reemergence on the international scene early in this decade, China has consistently opposed all proposals for nuclear weapons test bans, arms control, or disarmament. Peking insists that such proposals also must call for an end to stockpiles and production of nuclear weapons by all countries.

2. China's opposition continues under the new leadership that assumed control in Peking last year. Foreign Minister Huang Hua told a visiting US congressional delegation last April that the Comprehensive Test Ban's "purpose is very clear--to try to preserve the nuclear monopoly of the two superpowers and deprive other countries of the right to develop their (own) nuclear weapons." As talks between the US and USSR (and UK) progress toward a test ban treaty, Peking can be expected to continue to lash out at the negotiations in this manner.

3. China's dread of the Soviet Union's vastly superior forces motivates its extreme opposition to test ban agreements. Peking is concerned now with improving its own forces and therefore jealously protects what it considers its sovereign right to continue developing and testing nuclear weapons.

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4. This concern also leads Peking to support the right of other countries to develop their weapons. As recently as July 10, Chinese media approvingly described France's unwillingness to participate in the partial nuclear test ban treaty and other similar agreements. The article went on to praise France's "independent position" which gives it a "free hand to strengthen its defense."

5. Given this Chinese position, a number of conclusions can be drawn concerning Peking's likely attitude toward the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

- Should the US and USSR (and UK) reach agreement on a treaty, the Chinese will denounce the pact in strong terms in order to raise suspicions about the motives of the "superpowers" and deflect criticism of its own position.
- Should the test ban treaty be signed in conjunction with other important agreements between the US and USSR, China may have and express new doubts about the determination of the American administration to stand up to the Soviets. In this case, the terms of the treaty and other agreements will figure prominently in the Chinese judgment.
- The fact the talks are trilateral or bilateral will make little difference in Peking's view. A larger number of signatories, in fact, might prove embarrassing to the Chinese but such embarrassment has never tempered their opposition in the past.
- There is no chance the Chinese will decide to participate in a test ban immediately, and very little chance China will take part in the future. Peking regards participation in multilateral agreements as potential infringements on its sovereignty and approaches them warily. For the same reason it would oppose on-site inspections in principle.
- Peking will refuse to sign any agreement to which Taipei is also a signatory, since to sign would tend to admit the existence of "two Chinas." Peking at one time showed interest in a treaty to

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prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons. Even that interest ran aground on China's objection to Taipei's signature on the biological weapons convention of 1972.

-- The area in which China is most likely to show some interest in the future is underground testing. Although the Chinese vilified the recent treaty on underground explosions for peaceful purposes, they stopped short of an outright denunciation of testing being limited to underground. Given the Japanese and American sensitivity about radioactive fallout from Peking's latest explosions, the Chinese conceivably might come to see advantages to an agreement to confine their testing underground, particularly if their participation could be portrayed as a magnanimous gesture by the Chinese and not something which is designed to restrain them.

6. Overall, the Chinese record on arms control problems is essentially both rigid and negative. Peking's vociferous public opposition over many years to a wide range of proposals is matched by private disinclination even to explore seriously the ramifications of the problem. It has subscribed to proposals for nuclear-free zones only when its own interests are not directly involved, and in such cases it has not attempted to turn these proposals into reality through concerted diplomatic effort. In fact, the Chinese privately have condoned developments that tend to undercut these proposals.

7. This record shows that Peking is acutely conscious that it is militarily inferior to the two superpowers. The Chinese position on test bans is clearly designed to preserve for Peking the greatest possible leeway in building its own strategic arsenal--a long and expensive process. This position has survived essentially unchanged through the domestic political shifts of the last decade. It is likely to remain unchanged so long as China considers itself to be weak and vulnerable. Only when Peking believes itself a first-rate military power--even if not a superpower--are major changes in this rigid posture likely to occur.

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SUBJECT: Chinese Response to Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty

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